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THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
ILLINOIS V. RODRIGUEZ: WHY AN
OFFICER'S REASONABLE BELIEF
ABOUT A THIRD PARTY'S
AUTHORITY TO CONSENT
DOES NOT PROTECT A CRIMINAL
SUSPECT'S RIGHTS
I. INTRODUCTION
A receptionist buzzes DEA agents into the offices at a small
business, and the agents rummage through her bosses' offices.' A
woman calls the police and lets them into her sleeping boyfriend's
locked closet with keys which she removed from his pants. 2 Courts
found these searches constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
The courts in each of these cases determined that the police
reasonably believed that the consenting party had authority to con-
sent to the search, and thus, under Illinois v. Rodriguez,3 the searches
were valid. In Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court held that
if police reasonably believe that the person who consents to a search
has common authority over the property, the search will be valid
against a third party charged on the basis of the evidence seized.4
Despite the long history of the reasonableness standard, in Rodri-
guez, the Court ignored the underlying reasons for the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement. Moreover, because of its doctri-
nal flaws, the reasonableness standard enunciated in Rodriguez has
failed in application.
Both Justice Marshall and a student author have offered criti-
cisms of the test,5 but their alternative suggestions are incomplete
and unworkable, respectively. Because of the problems surround-
I See United States v. Sudzus, No. 92 Cr 102, 1992 WL 162959 (N.D. Ill. July 2,
1992).
2 See United States v. Kinney, 953 F.2d 863 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
2976 (1992).
3 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
4 Id.
5 See infra notes 237-59 and accompanying text.
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ing both the reasonableness test and the alternative proposals, this
Comment suggests that the Court adopt a "common authority in
fact" test. This test would require that a person who consents to the
search actually have common authority over the place or item
searched. Such a test would protect the rights of defendants from
arbitrary and unexpected searches while simultaneously preventing
defendants from shifting the burdens of their criminal activities
onto innocent third parties. Additionally, such a test would not sig-
nificantly impede law enforcement efforts.
This Comment will first trace the history of the Fourth Amend-
ment including an analysis of the case law leading up to the Rodri-
guez decision. The Rodriguez decision will then be examined in
detail. Next, this Comment will explore criticisms of the reasona-
bleness standard and survey recent cases which demonstrate each of
its shortcomings. Then, other possible tests will be explored. Fi-
nally, this Comment proposes a new "common authority in fact"
test and applies it to some of the criticized cases.
II. BACKGROUND
This section explores the history of the Fourth Amendment,
which provides the basis for all search and seizure case law. The
amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.6
By its plain language, the amendment seems to be designed to
guard the security of persons and their houses from searches not
reasonably grounded in factual beliefs.7 Over time, the Court has
interpreted the language in a way that has continually placed more
emphasis on reasonableness-especially in the case of warrantless
searches.
In Brinegar v. United States,8 an early case in which the reasona-
bleness test was utilized, the Court held that while the police need
not always be factually correct in conducting a warrantless search,
6 U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
7 Alternatively, the word "reasonableness" could be used to address the scope of
the search. In other words, such a reading would limit the extent to which a place or
person could be searched before the Constitution requires a warrant. The Supreme
Court's interpretations, however, seem to focus on the reasonableness of the govern-
ment agent's beliefs and conclusions about the facts of the situation. See, e.g., Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
8 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
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such a search must always be reasonable. In Brinegar, the defendant
had a reputation for illegally transporting liquor across state lines in
violation of 27 U.S.C. § 223.9 One day when the defendant's car
passed an officer, who was parked on the edge of a highway, the
officer recognized the defendant and noted that the defendant's ve-
hicle looked "heavily loaded." 10 Upon stopping the vehicle, the of-
ficer could see one case of alcohol in the front seat of the car, but
the defendant later denied that any liquor was visible.11 The de-
fendant was arrested for the 27 U.S.C. § 223 violation, and the of-
ficer seized the alcohol in the car as well as the alcohol he found in
the trunk after the arrest. The defendant challenged the constitu-
tionality of his arrest on the grounds that the officer did not have
probable cause, and thus the seizure of the alcohol was not pursuant
to a valid stop. 1
2
The Supreme Court, in finding the arrest to be constitutional,
stated that the officer had probable cause to stop the defendant's
car.I3 The Court emphasized that "probable cause" was the stan-
dard for conducting the arrest, not "guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt" as is required for criminal convictions.' 4 The Court stressed
that if the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard were used in ordi-
nary arrests, officers rarely could take "effective" action in protect-
ing the public good because the standard would be too high to
meet. 15 The Court noted that to require more than probable cause
would harm law enforcement, while to allow less than probable
cause would "leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers'
whim or caprice."' 16 Nonetheless, the Court cautioned, probable
cause still requires "a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.'
17
Thus, the Court announced that it would consider the reasonable-
ness of an officer's belief when it evaluates a warrantless search.
9 Id. at 162. 27 U.S.C. § 223 (1936) provided:
Whoever shall import, bring or transport any intoxicating liquor into any State in
which all sales . . . of intoxicating liquor containing more than 4 per centum of
alcohol by volume are prohibited, otherwise than in the course of continuous inter-
state transportation through such State, or attempt so to do, or assist in so doing,
shall ... if all importation, bringing, or transportation or intoxicating liquor into
such State is prohibited by the law thereof; be guilty of a misdemeanor and fined
not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. 27 U.S.C.
§ 223 (1936).
10 Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 162-63.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 170-71.
14 Id. at 174.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 176.
17 Id. at 175.
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The boundaries of the reasonableness test for warrantless
searches were made clearer a decade and a half after Brinegar in
Stoner v. California.18 In Stoner, the Court emphasized that the Fourth
Amendment should not be infringed upon by "unrealistic doctrines
of apparent authority," thus shifting the inquiry more toward de-
fendants' rights.1 9 The police trailed the defendants, who were sus-
pects in a robbery, to a hotel in which they were staying.20 The
officers discovered that defendant Stoner was out of his room be-
cause his keys had been left at the hotel desk in accordance with
hotel policy. 21 The officers explained their desire to search Stoner's
room to the hotel clerk.22 The clerk then led the officers to Stoner's
room and let them in. The officers, upon entering the room, discov-
ered evidence of the robbery which was later used to convict
Stoner.23
In rejecting the government's arguments that the search was
constitutional, the Supreme Court in Stoner dismissed the notion
that the consent of the hotel clerk validated the search, stating that
"[o]ur decisions make clear that the rights protected by the Fourth
Amendment are not to be eroded by strained applications of the law
of agency or by unrealistic doctrines of 'apparent authority.' "24
The Court stressed that protection from search and seizure was the
defendant's procedural right, not the clerk's or the hotel's. 25 Thus,
only the defendant's word or deed could be used to waive the right,
either personally or through an agent.26 The Court acknowledged
that, by staying in a hotel, a person gives implied or express consent
to allow repairmen and maids to enter the room to conduct their
ordinary duties. However, a guest at a hotel, like a boarder or ten-
ant of a house, is entitled to protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures, and that protection would be lost if "it were
left to depend on the unfettered discretion" of a hotel employee.27
Thus, even though the clerk had the ability to enter the room as
part of the ordinary procedures of hotel management, the police
18 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
19 Id. at 488.
20 Id. at 484-85.
21 Id. at 485.
22 Id
23 Id. at 485-86. Stoner was convicted in a jury trial, the conviction was affirmed by
the intermediate court of review in California, and further review was denied by the
Supreme Court of California before his appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Id.
at 484.
24 Id. at 488.
25 Id. at 489.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 489-90.
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were not allowed to rely on this as sufficient control to authorize a
search. In short, the Court in Stoner effectively placed a limit on the
reasonableness test, stating that apparent authority would not ordi-
narily be sufficient to validate a search.
In Katz v. United States,28 decided shortly after Stoner, the Court
stated that whether a warrantless search or seizure is reasonable
may depend in part on the relationship of the parties, rather than
the place searched. The Court considered the constitutionality of
placing listening devices on the outside of a telephone booth to
monitor a suspect's conversation.2 9 In upholding this search, the
Court in Katz noted that "the Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places[, but w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amend-
ment protection."30 Thus, the Court concluded that one should not
simply consider where the search took place but also the relation-
ships among the consenter, the searcher, and the defendant.
3'
In Terry v. Ohio,32 the Supreme Court expanded on the "rela-
tionship" theme discussed in Katz. The Court stated that in con-
ducting a search, a police officer must consider his own safety
interests, the protection of the public, and the defendant's privacy
interests; thus, it clearly laid out the policies that courts should con-
sider in making a determination about Fourth Amendment
violations.33
In Terry, an officer observed two men peering in a store window
and walking back and forth on a street, conferring occasionally.
3 4
After witnessing what he believed to be suspicious action, the officer
approached them and performed a pat down search on defendant
Terry, which revealed a gun. Terry was subsequently charged with
carrying a concealed weapon. 35 At trial, Terry claimed that the
search had not been performed incident to a lawful arrest. The trial
court denied this claim, asserting that some interrogation could and
should have been made because these men had been acting suspi-
ciously.3 6 The trial court held that a pat down search could lawfully
be conducted for the protection of the officer because, based on the
suspects' actions, the officer had reason to believe the suspects
28 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
29 Id. at 348-49.
30 Id. at 351.
31 Id.
32 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
33 Id.
34 Id. at 5-6.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 7-8.
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might be armed.3 7
The Supreme Court, in affirming the trial court, employed a
reasonable person standard to determine whether the officer was
justified in conducting the pat down search.38 In asking whether the
facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or search
would "warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief" that
the action taken was appropriate, the Court focused on the reasona-
bleness of the officer's belief that he and others may have been in
danger.3 9 The Court noted that the subjective good faith of the of-
ficer was not enough -to justify the search, because, if subjectivity
were the test, "the protections of the Fourth Amendment would
evaporate, and the people would be 'secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects' only in the discretion of the police."'40 Thus, the
Court emphasized that the reasonableness standard requires more
than minimal suspicion when an officer is evaluating the risks that
confront him and the public.
The Court placed a great deal of emphasis on the interests of
law enforcement as compared to an individual's privacy interests. 4'
First, the Court in Terry recognized the government's interest in
crime detection and prevention.42 The Court noted that the de-
fendant's behavior was suspicious because he continually gazed in
the same window. 43 In these situations, the Court decided that an
officer should be able to inquire into a suspect's behavior to prevent
what is most likely a crime waiting to happen.
44
Second, the Court noted an officer's interest in protecting him-
self from the threat of injury from the person with whom he is deal-
ing.45 By patting down the defendant in Terry, the officer was
making certain that Terry would not draw a weapon during the in-
quiry as to Terry's actions. The Court asserted that probable cause
need not be required for officers to take actions to protect them-
selves and other potential victims of crimes from harm.46
Finally, even though a search of outer clothing is a violation of
37 Id. at 8. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction and the Supreme Court of
Ohio dismissed the appeal for lack of a "substantial constitutional question," after which
Terry appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Id.
38 Id. at 21-22.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 22 (quoting U.S. CoNST. amend. IV).
41 Id.
42 Id. at 22-23.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 23.
46 Id. at 24.
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the "sanctity of the individual" and cannot be undertaken absent
sufficient circumstances, the Court stated that a pat down is much
less intrusive than the "seizure" of a suspect pursuant to an arrest,
and thus is reasonable when the officer has reason to believe that he
or others are potentially in danger.47 A search of outer clothing is
brief and necessary to protect the officer from potential danger
while the officer gathers information to determine whether a valid
reason for arrest exists. 48 Thus, the reasonableness inquiry shifted
from a strict protection of defendants to a balance of protecting de-
fendants, insuring the safety interests of officers and the public, and
effecting law enforcement goals.
In the next significant case in this area, the Supreme Court ex-
panded on its earlier concern for effective law enforcement.49 It
held that, absent coercion, personal liberty interests are adequately
guarded when an individual consents to a search. Thus, a search to
which a person consents is reasonable. In Schneckloth, an officer
stopped a car because it had a burned out headlight.50 Only one of
the passengers, who was not the driver, could produce a license. He
identified the car as belonging to his brother. 51 After two additional
officers arrived, the officers asked this man if they could search the
car. The man consented and unlocked both the trunk and the glove
compartment. 52 The officers found three stolen checks and used
them against the defendant, another passenger in the car, in a sub-
sequent criminal trial.53 The defendant was convicted by the trial
court.
54
In analyzing the constitutional validity of the search, the Court
in Schneckloth accepted the trial court's finding that the consent was
truly voluntary because no coercion was present in the officers' ac-
tions.5 5 The Court elaborated on the importance of consensual
searches, asserting that "it is not part of the policy underlying the
47 Id. at 25-27.
48 Id.
49 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).




54 The California Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. The California Supreme
Court denied review. Subsequently, the defendant sought a writ of habeas corpus in
federal district court, which was denied; however, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit vacated this denial, stating that the standard the state must meet in California is
to show that consent had not been coerced and that the consenting party gave it know-
ing that it could have been withheld. The Supreme Court granted review to determine if
the Constitution required this showing. Id. at 220-22.
55 Id. at 228-32.
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Fourth... Amendment[] to discourage citizens from aiding to the
utmost of their ability in the apprehension of criminals." 56
Although it is not necessary to show valid consent, the suspect's
knowledge that he had a right not to consent may be a factor consid-
ered by the court.57 In the instant case, the Court noted that the
Fourth Amendment is primarily concerned with an individual's right
to be left alone.58 However, the Court held there simply is nothing
"constitutionally suspect in consenting to a search." 59 In fact, the
Court continued, the community has a strong interest in securing
such consent so that innocent people are not erroneously convicted
in criminal proceedings as a result of an incomplete evidentiary
base. 6
0
The Court also considered the question of third-party consent
and stated that third-party consent to searches could be reasonable
where the requisite authority existed.6 1 It cited several cases as ex-
amples of proper authority. First, the Court noted that by sharinga
gym bag with a third party, one assumes the risk that the third party
may consent to a search of the bag.62 The Court also noted that a
wife may turn over to the police clothes and guns belonging to her
husband as long as the wife had not been coerced.63 In each of
these cases, unlike Stoner, the consenting party had shared authority
over the area searched, and thus the searches were reasonable.
Additionally, the Court noted that there was no error in admit-
ting evidence seized in a defendant's apartment when the police ar-
rested a third party at that apartment believing him to be the
defendant.64 The search was upheld because the police had prob-
able cause to arrest the defendant, and thus the search would have
been valid pursuant to arrest had the actual suspect been seized.65
Thus, Schneckloth provided the basis for evaluation of consensual
searches that would be subsequently addressed in the context of
third-party consents.
The reasonableness of a third party's consent to a warrantless
search was addressed directly in United States v. Matlock.66 In Matlock,
56 Id. at 243 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)).
57 Id. at 246-47.
58 Ido
59 Id at 242-43.
60 Id. at 243.
61 Id. at 245.
62 Id. (citing Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969)).
63 Id. (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)).
64 Id. at 245-46 (citing Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971)).
65 Id. at 246.
66 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
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the Court held that a search pursuant to the permission of a person
who has common authority over premises or a piece of property is
valid against constitutional attacks by an absent, nonconsenting de-
fendant. 67 The defendant resided in a house that was rented by
Marshall, her children and her grandson.68 The trial court found
that Marshall's daughter consented to a police search of the house
for money and a gun. The daughter specifically permitted a search
of a bedroom which she said she and the defendant jointly occu-
pied. 69 The officers, during their search of the bedroom, discovered
$4,995 in stolen currency in a diaper bag.70 The defendant was sub-
sequently arrested for robbery. The evidence was suppressed by the
trial court as being seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment,
and the government appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which af-
firmed.7' The government then appealed to the Supreme Court.
72
On appeal the Supreme Court asserted that, as a general mat-
ter, "the consent of one who possesses common authority over
premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting per-
son with whom that authority is shared." 73 In defining common au-
thority, the Court noted that common authority should not be
assumed simply from a mere property interest:
[The right of one with common authority to consent] rests rather on
mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or
control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that
any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his
own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their
number might permit a common area to be searched.74
The Court noted that the defendant and Marshall's daughter had
represented themselves as husband and wife and were known to be
regularly sleeping together. 75 However, the Court remanded the
case for the trial court to determine whether the evidence was suffi-
cient to support the conviction after this opinion. 76 Significantly, a
footnote in the Court's opinion expressly left open the question of
whether a search would be valid under the Fourth Amendment if a
third party who had apparent authority to consent to a search, but
who in fact did not possess such authority, allowed the police to
67 Id.
68 Id. at 166.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 166-67.
71 Id. at 167-69.
72 Id. at 169.
73 Id. at 170.
74 Id. at 171 n.7.
75 Id. at 168.
76 Id. at 177-78.
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search the premises. 77
III. ILLINOIS v. RODRIGUEZ AND THE REASONABLENESS STANDARD
Illinois v. Rodriguez,78 the most recent case in which the Supreme
Court has considered the reasonableness of third-party consent, ad-
dressed the issue left open by Matlock. In Rodriguez, the police were
called to Dorothy Jackson's residence and were met by Jackson's
daughter, Gail Fischer, who had apparently been beaten.79 Fischer
stated that the defendant had assaulted her earlier that day at an
apartment where the defendant was currently asleep. She agreed to
accompany the police to the apartment and let them in with her
key.80 While traveling to the apartment with the police, Fischer re-
ferred to the apartment as "our" apartment and admitted to having
clothes and furniture there.8 1 Upon arriving at the apartment,
Fischer opened the door for the police, and the police noticed open
containers of white powder in both rooms.8 2 The defendant was
arrested, and the substances were seized. At no time did the police
obtain or seek to obtain a search warrant before proceeding to the
defendant's residence.8 3
The defendant, charged with possession of a controlled sub-
stance, moved to have the evidence gathered during his arrest sup-
pressed on the ground that Fischer had moved out of the apartment
several weeks before the beating and did not have "common author-
ity" over the residence.8 4 The trial court found that Fischer was
simply an "infrequent visitor," not a "usual resident," because her
name was not on the lease, she did not help pay the rent, she did not
have permission to invite others to the apartment without the de-
fendant's consent, she did not have access to the apartment when
defendant was away, and she had moved some of her belongings out
of the apartment.8 5 Furthermore, the trial court noted that the rec-
ord was unclear as to whether she still resided at the apartment at
the time of the beating.8 6 Thus, the court granted the defendant's
motion to suppress the evidence. The trial court's decision was up-
77 Id. at 177 n.14.
78 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
79 Id. at 179. The opinion does not state who placed the call.
80 Id.
81 Id.




86 Id. at 179.
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held by the appellate court.87 The Illinois Supreme Court denied
the state's Petition for Leave to Appeal, and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 88
In Rodriguez, the Court expanded the ability of third parties to
consent to searches and seizures by adopting a reasonableness test
under which courts are to consider whether an officer reasonably
believed that a third party had authority to consent to a search of the
defendant's property.8 9 Significantly, "reasonableness" was ex-
panded to include the officer's reasonableness in belief about the
identity and authority of a third party. 90 In other words, the Court
changed the focus from simply reviewing the reasonableness of an
officer's belief about a suspect's guilt to also considering the reason-
ableness of an officer's belief about the relation of a third party to a
suspect.
The Court began its analysis by citing Schneckloth for the propo-
sition that Fourth Amendment prohibitions do not apply when con-
sent to a search has been obtained, and by citing Matlock for the
theory that a third party who possesses common authority may also
consent to a search. 9' In Rodriguez, the Court found that Fischer did
not possess common authority over the premises. 92 She had moved
out of the apartment almost a month before the call, taking her chil-
dren's clothes with her but leaving behind some of her personal be-
longings. 93 Furthermore, almost four weeks had passed since she
had last spent the night at Rodriguez's apartment, invited friends
there when he was not home, or entered when he was not present.
94
She also admitted that she had taken a key without Rodriguez's
knowledge. 95 Thus, under Matlock, Fischer did not possess the au-
thority to consent to the search of the defendant's house. More-
over, the Court found that there was no waiver by the defendant of
his right to consent to the search. 96
Although the Court stressed that the decision to waive trial
rights must be "knowing and intelligent," it noted that nothing in the
87 Id. at 180.
88 Id. at 180-81.
89 Id. at 188-89.
90 Id. at 181.
91 Id. (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); United States v. Mat-
lock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974)).
92 Id. at 181-82.
93 Id. at 181.
94 Id.





purposes or practical application of a "knowing or intelligent"
waiver of trial rights suggests that the same standard should be ap-
plied to the issue of third-party consent to searches and seizures. 97
The Court said Schneckloth stands for the idea that, "where it applies,
... no evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment will be
introduced at trial ... unless a person consents." 98 However, what
is guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, according to the Court, is
not that no search of the person's house may occur without his con-
sent, but simply that no such search may occur that is unreasona-
ble.99 The Court then concluded that one factor that will make the
search of a house reasonable is the consent of a co-tenant. 100
The Court then expanded this reasonableness standard to allow
a person who is not a co-tenant to consent if the officers reasonably
believe that this person possesses the authority of a co-tenant. 10 1 In
support, the Court noted that since warrants only require "probable
cause," no more than "a proper assessment of probabilities in par-
ticular contexts" should be required. 10 2 It also noted that a search
would be reasonable if it were conducted pursuant to a valid war-
rant, but that "reasonableness" does not preclude error with re-
spect to the factual judgments about the area subject to. the
warrant.' 03 Finally, the Court noted that a search pursuant to an
arrest is not discredited simply because the police arrested the
wrong person under the reasonable belief that the person was actu-
ally the suspect. 10
4
The Court then cited Brinegar for the proposition that, under
the Fourth Amendment, searches need not always be correct, but
they must always be reasonable, thus stressing the entrenched no-
tion that reasonableness is the focal point in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. A reasonableness standard, the Court observed,
would allow officers some room for mistakes, but would also require
them to act "on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of
probability."' 1 5 Thus, in Rodriguez, the Court concluded that police
searches pursuant to the consent of one who does not in reality have
authority to consent, but whom the police reasonably believe has
this authority, is no more violative of the Fourth Amendment than
97 Id. at 183.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 183-84.
101 Id.
102 Id. (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)).
103 Id. at 184-85 (citing Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987)).
104 Id. at 185 (citing Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971)).
105 Id. (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
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when police reasonably, but incorrectly, believe they are in pursuit
of a violent felon who is about to escape.106
The Court also presented two possible readings of Stoner, in
which the Court said that "the rights protected by the Fourth
Amendment are not to be eroded .. .by unrealistic doctrines of
'apparent authority.' "107 The Court explained that this term could
be read as saying that all reliance on apparent authority is per se un-
realistic or as saying that the Court frowned on apparent authority
only when it is unrealistic.10 8 The Court favored the latter interpre-
tation. It emphasized that the issue in apparent authority cases is
not waiver of the right to be free of unreasonable searches, but viola-
tion of the right to be free of such searches. 10 9 The Court found
significance in the fact that in Stoner the record contained no infor-
mation at all to suggest that the police had a basis to believe the
night clerk had authority to authorize the search.1' 0 The Rodriguez
Court stated that Stoner did not stand for the sole proposition that
the appearance of authority could never validate a search."'
Rather, the Court explained, the Stoner decision may have been left
vague intentionally. Thus, Stoner can reasonably and preferably be
read to mean that in that case no reasonable basis to uphold the
search existed, given the facts the police encountered.'12 The Rodri-
guez Court stressed that it did not intend to validate every search at a
person's invitation, even when the person claims to live in at a cer-
tain place, because in some cases "the surrounding circumstances
could conceivably be such that a reasonable person would doubt its
truth and not act upon it without further inquiry." ' 1 3 The Supreme
Court instead adopted an "objective" inquiry: "[w]ould the facts
available to the officer at the moment. . . 'warrant a man of reason-
able caution in the belief' that the consenting party had authority
over the premises?"' 1 4 The Court then remanded the case because
106 Id.
107 Id. at 187 (citing Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 488 (1964)).
108 Id.
109 Id.
10 Id. at 187-88.
111 Id. at 188.
112 Id.
113 Id. The Court may have misspoken here and inadvertently changed the standard,
as there is an apparent difference in whether a person has reason to doubt the authority
of a party to consent to a search and whether a person has reason to believe that a person
has authority to consent. The difference is that the first implies a specific reason to
doubt authority must be found, while the latter suggests that a positive reason to believe
authority exists must be present.
114 Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)).
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the lower courts had not addressed that question. 115
IV. THE FAILURE OF RODRIGUEZ AS A DOCTRINAL MATTER
This section of this Comment will show how Rodriguez has
stepped outside the existing precedent and policies set forth in the
Fourth Amendment cases previously discussed. In Brinegar v. United
States,1 6 the Supreme Court dealt with suspicion about an individ-
ual's violation of law. It held that "probable cause" was "reason-
able" for Fourth Amendment search purposes. The decision did
not consider what would be reasonable when a third party was in-
volved.117 In Rodriguez, however, the Court not only dealt with sus-
picion as to the individual defendant's guilt, but also considered
questions regarding the honesty of the consenter. As a result, the
Court has added a greater risk to the Fourth Amendment calculus.
In addition to the risk that an officer's beliefs about the defendant's
guilt could be wrong, there is a risk that the officer will be mistaken
in his perception as to whether a third party has authority to consent
to a search. This added risk of incorrectness is a serious reduction
in a defendant's right to be free from unreasonable search.
Rodriguez was similarly untrue to Stoner v. California,'18 in which
the Court noted that only the defendant can waive his right to pri-
vacy. Admittedly, there should be cases where the defendant's ac-
tions impliedly waive this right, such as a search of areas jointly
occupied in a cohabitation situation. However, if a third party who
is not in reality a common owner or occupant is involved, the de-
fendant has not had the opportunity to choose whether to waive his
rights. Therefore, any consent granted by such a third party lacks
authority per se. The Court in Rodriguez mistakenly took Stoner to say
that only apparent authority which is unreasonable is intolerable.
This reading, however, entirely neglects those policies underlying
the Fourth Amendment pertaining to a defendant's right to be free
from a warrantless search in most cases.
The Court made a similar observation in Katz v. United States,119
in which it decided that the validity of a warrantless search depends
on the relationship of the parties. Thus, when there is no direct
consensual relationship (actual or implied), the defendant should
not be deemed to accept the risks of a search, because there can be
no reasonable consent to an unknown party.
115 Id- at 189.
116 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
117 For further discussion, see Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 196-98 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
118 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
119 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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In Terry v. Ohio, 120 the Court emphasized the importance of ef-
fective law enforcement and the need to protect officers and third
parties. Certainly, it can be argued that reasonableness as a stan-
dard to govern third-party authority to consent to a search will lead
to more effective law enforcement at a lower cost. However, Tery
requires a balancing, and there is always a line that must be drawn if
the Fourth Amendment is to have any effect. Denying officers the
right to search without a warrant, without consent, and not pursuant
to an arrest or exigent circumstances seems to be a reasonable place
to draw that line.12 1 The fact that consent frequently turns out to be
effective provides no answer: the Fourth Amendment does not pro-
tect individuals from unreasonable searches "most of the time."
Additionally, unlike Terry, in Rodriguez there was no immediate risk
to the officer or to a third party's safety. Finally, it should be noted
that because in Terry the officers (and later the Court) were dealing
with the suspect directly, the case did not involve the inherent "rea-
sonableness of belief' risks of dealing with a third party in addition
to the defendant.12
2
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte123 stressed that voluntary individual
consent satisfied the Fourth Amendment. 124 Clearly, such volunta-
riness cannot exist in situations like Rodriguez, in which authority is
actually lacking. It is hard to imagine why an individual would vol-
untarily consent to searches at the whim of a person with whom she
does not have a strong relationship. The defendant simply has
nothing to gain in letting strangers or persons she does not trust
have authority over her space or belongings.
The reasoning in United States v. Matlock125 was also misapplied
by the Rodriguez majority. A third party was able to consent to a
search of the defendant's room in Matlock because the defendant
had given authority to consent to a search by sharing his room with
120 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
121 This is a reasonable place for such a line, as it protects a defendant's right to be
free from searches before an arrest is made and before a defendant is given the opportu-
nity to permit or deny a search. Moreover, this line guards society's interest in quick law
enforcement when the defendant poses the threat of immediate harm or may slip away
before a warrant can be obtained. Finally, this line allows a person with whom the de-
fendant implicitly or explicitly shares common authority to permit a search of common
property. Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 197, 203-05 (1993).
122 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
123 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
124 Even though consent was by a third party in Schneckloth, the defendant who volun-
tarily occupied the car with the consenter can be considered to have authorized other
passengers to consent to a search under Matlock and Katz.
125 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
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a third party. The defendant thus consented to common occupancy
and authority over the area. An individual can assess the risks of
implied or actual consent. However, the risks become near limitless
when the risk of a search depends not on the conduct of the individ-
ual target of a search, but on the reasonable beliefs of a police of-
ficer about a third person.
Cases such as Illinois v. Gates,126 Hill v. California,127 and Mary-
land v. Garrison,128 which the Rodriguez majority cited, are not dispos-
itive in the context of third-party consents to searches. These cases
dealt with probable cause for arrest of a defendant, which is the
standard for making a seizure of a defendant reasonable. However,
in the area of reasonableness of third-party authority, probable
cause is not relevant: the issue of reasonableness goes to the of-
ficer's beliefs about the authority of the third party, not to the of-
ficer's beliefs about the defendant's guilt or threat.1 29
As is apparent from the preceding discussion, Rodriguez, with its
focus on the reasonableness of officers' beliefs rather than on de-
fendants' rights to be free from unreasonable searches, has signifi-
cantly changed the "reasonableness" landscape. In previous cases,
such as Matlock, the defendant's consent was a controlling factor.
Now, due to a perceived need for more effective law enforcement,
the defendant's consent is a secondary consideration. Rodriguez is
thus untrue to precedent doctrinally because it shifts the focus more
than ever to the officer's beliefs and, also because it deals incorrectly
with the reasonableness of an officer's beliefs about a third party's
relationship to the defendant.
V. THE FAILURE OF RODRIGUEZ IN THE LOWER COURTS
The doctrinal problems of the Rodriguez reasonableness test are
further illustrated by the fact that lower court application of the test
fails to protect individuals. A significant number of cases demon-
strate the shortfalls of the Supreme Court's test, which sacrifices the
very rights the Fourth Amendment sought to protect in the name of
effective law enforcement.
This section will illustrate three inadequacies of the Rodriguez
test as applied by lower courts. First, a defendant loses her right to
not have her property searched by someone who has an insufficient
relation to the property as a result of incomplete questioning by
126 462 U.S. 213 (1983). See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
127 401 U.S. 797 (1971). See supra note 104 and accompanying text.




government agents. Second, a defendant loses the ability to foresee
such searches and adequately prepare herself. Third, third party
rights are not incrementally protected.130
A. LOSS OF PROTECTION OF ONE'S PROPERTY AS A RESULT OF
INSUFFICIENT INQUIRY BY GOVERNMENT AGENTS
The defendant in a criminal proceeding may lose the right to
not have her home invaded when a third party who has no authority
to do so authorizes a search. The Supreme Court's rule tends to
discourage government agents from conducting an extensive inves-
tigation of the facts before entering property. If the agents can
show "reasonable belief," there is no incentive to take further meas-
ures to determine whether the person who claims shared authority
has actual authority over the premises.' 3 ' Because of their training
and jobs, the police will naturally have a superior ability to ask ques-
tions which, when read to the jury, will make it appear as if the po-
lice were reasonable in believing that the consenting party had
authority to allow the search. Additionally, the police will know
which questions not to ask-especially those which may reveal that a
party does not have the requisite authority to allow a search. 132 If
the agents actually discover that the third party does not have au-
thority, investigation will be delayed while the necessary warrants
are prepared. Thus, the rule places the target of a search in
jeopardy.
A flagrant abuse of the Supreme Court's reasonableness stan-
130 While individual cases are used to illustrate particular problems, often they serve
as relevant examples of the other flaws and will be thus noted in the footnotes.
131 Another problem might occur if police simply accept a third party's claim of au-
thority. An extreme example would occur if the police drove up to a house and encoun-
tered a person standing in front of the house who said, "Yes, that's my house. You may
search it with my blessing." Obviously, an occurrence such as this is more than highly
unlikely; nonetheless, it does illustrate the potential for a third party to "set up" a de-
fendant.
A more likely "set up" scenario might occur in this manner: a neighbor calls the
police pretending to be the husband of the defendant. He knows that she is at work and
that the house is otherwise empty. He claims that the defendant left home in a rage and
locked him out of the house because she was on drugs, which he claims are in the house.
Police break down the door after questioning him and find contraband that is used
against the defendant, because the police "reasonably" believed the man was the de-
fendant's husband and had the power to consent.
This scenario also raises a foreseeability problem, because a defendant has no way
to foresee such a "set up." See infra Part V.B.
132 In her note discussed below, Tammy Campbell discussed the negative incentive
on police that this holding may have. Tammy Campbell, Note, Illinois v. Rodriguez:




dard is exemplified by United States v. Sudzus,13 3 in which a court used
the Rodriguez reasonableness test to hold that the police reasonably
believed that a receptionist had sufficient authority over her bosses'
offices to consent to a search.' 3 4 In Sudzus, Drug Enforcement
Agency agents entered an office building in which a sale of cocaine
had been previously arranged. After passing through the outer
doors, the agents were stopped by glass doors leading into the inner
offices.' 3 5 When defendant Barbra Sudzus refused to "buzz" the
agents into the inner offices, they entered forcibly and secured the
premises. One of the agents asked her if she had access to the build-
ing and "control over the premises" and if the agents could search
for "money, narcotics and guns."' 1 6 She responded in the affirma-
tive, stating that the office had "nothing to hide" and agreed to sign
a consent form at the agent's request. 3 7 The agents found cocaine
during their search and Barbra and several other individuals in the
office were charged with conspiring to possess, with intent to dis-
tribute, approximately five kilograms of cocaine.' 3 8 At trial, the de-
fendants challenged the evidence gathered during the search, and
Barbra claimed that she did not have the authority to consent. She
further stated that she did not sign the form until an hour after the
search when the agents told her that signing was a mere formality
and that, if she refused, they would simply obtain a warrant any-
way.' 39 The court nonetheless denied motions to suppress the
evidence. 14
0
The court in Sudzus methodically applied the Rodriguez test and
found that even if an individual lacked actual authority to consent to
a search, the search would be valid if the agents reasonably believed
that the occupant had "common authority over the premises." 14 1 In
finding that defendant Barbra reasonably appeared to have such au-
thority, the court initially found that she occupied a space directly
behind the window and "monitored the entry of customers and
others."'142 Coupled with the claim that she maintained control over
the building, including access to the inner offices, the agents could
reasonably infer that she had the requisite common authority over
133 No. 92 Cr 102, 1992 WL 162959 (N.D. Ill. July 2, 1992).





139 Id. at *2.
140 Id. at *1.




the space to allow the search. 143 Thus, the search was upheld. 144
This case clearly demonstrates how government agents can
gain access to incriminating material even when the individual does
not have an interest in or authority over the area searched. The
management of most businesses would not ordinarily grant the au-
thority to consent to a search to a receptionist such as Barbra. Had
the police asked questions to clarify Barbra's authority, they would
have determined her lack thereof and would have had to pursue a
warrant.14
5
A lack of sufficient relationship to the property searched also
appeared in State v. Charles.146 In that case, the police had reason to
believe that a murder suspect was staying at his cousin's home.147
When the police went to the house, they found that neither the sus-
pect, Charles, nor his cousin were present. However, the cousin's
wife was home, and allowed the police to search the house. 148 The
police saw a closed suitcase in the den and the woman identified it as
the suspect's. Her husband then returned and both consented to
the search of the suitcase. 149 The police seized the suspect's gun,
found inside the suitcase, as evidence that he was the murderer.150
The suspect claimed this evidence was seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. 151 In pretrial motions, the suspect moved that
the evidence be suppressed, but the court declined. The suspect
then appealed to the Louisiana appellate court. 15
2
In applying Rodriguez to uphold the reasonableness of the of-
ficers' belief about the cousin's ability to consent, the appellate
court focused on the reduced privacy expectations that the defend-
ant had when he left his suitcase in a highly traveled area.153 The
court noted that Charles stayed in the den of his cousin's house. His
cousin's family ate, played and watched television in the den. His
cousin's two children went through the den to get to the backyard.
As a result, the court concluded that Charles could not expect much
14 Id.
144 Id.
145 Alternatively, the police could have tried to justify the warrantless search on other
grounds, such as exigent circumstances.
146 602 So. 2d 15 (La. Ct. App. 1992); writ granted in part on other issue, denied in part,
judgment affirmed, 607 So. 2d 566 (1992); appeal after remand, 617 So. 2d 895 (La. Ct. App.
1993).






153 Id. at 17-18.
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privacy in such an area.1 54
In addition, the court noted that Charles had not been given a
closet for his things, nor did he tell others to stay away from them.
His suitcase was latched, but it was not kept locked, and Charles had
shown his cousin the hand gun but said it came from ajunkyard. 155
The court thus concluded that suspect's expectation of privacy was
diminished.156
The court explained that a co-inhabitant has "the right to per-
mit an inspection in his own right and that others have assumed the
risk that one of number might permit the common area to be
searched."' 157 The court relied on Rodriguez and held that the search
was justifiable under the reasonable beliefs of the officers about the
cousin's ability to consent.' 58 The court pointed to the fact that
others knew the suspect was at the scene of the murder, had gone to
stay with his cousin, and had taken the gun with him. Thus, the
court concluded the search was valid.' 5 9
Here, the suspect should have had a right to not have his be-
longings sifted through by government authorities because the peo-
ple with whom he was staying had no "joint access or control for
most purposes" 160 in the property searched. The defendant's
cousin and his wife specifically told the officer that the suitcase be-
longed to someone else, which should have been enough to indicate
that it was likely that access was not shared. Moreover, the police
may have been able to determine that the cousin did not have the
authority to permit a search of the suitcase by simply asking enough
or proper questions. If the answers were incomplete or otherwise
unsatisfactory, the police could have secured a warrant.1 6 1 As a re-
sult, the suspect's protection against having his belongings searched
was sacrificed.
In United States v. Whitfteld,162 the district court and the D.C. Cir-
cuit applied the "reasonableness" test differently to a situation in
which the police wanted to search the defendant's room when the
defendant lived with his mother. In Whitfield, the defendant had sto-
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id- at 18.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 19.
159 Id.
160 United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974).
161 If the officers were concerned that the defendant would escape or destroy evi-
dence, presumably the exception to the warrant requirement for exigent circumstances
would validate the nonconsensual search.
162 747 F. Supp. 807 (D.D.C. 1990), rev'd 939 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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len $43,000.163 FBI agents assigned to the case went to the defend-
ant's home to talk to him, but when they discovered that the
defendant was not at home, they talked to his mother, Farrie Whit-
field, instead.' 64 Farrie said that she lived at the home with her
daughter and two sons.' 65 In attempting to determine the housing
relationship between the defendant and his mother, the agent asked
if the defendant paid rent and his mother responded, "Get real-
that boy's been unemployed."' 166 Farrie later denied making the
statement and claimed rather that she told the agent her son ordina-
rily paid $500 per month, but had only been able to pay $100 in
recent months. 167 At this point, Agent Salter asked whether the de-
fendant's room was open, and when Farrie responded that it was, he
asked to see it.168 Although the defendant's mother consented to
the search, she refused to sign a consent form. 69 The agents dis-
covered $16,000 in the defendant's jacket, but before searching any
further, the defendant's brother, Willie Whitfield, came home and
told his mother to ask the agents to leave.' 70 The defendant turned
himself over to the authorities not long after this occurrence, but
questioned the validity of the search.' 71
At trial, Agent Salter said he did not leave the scene to get a
warrant because he was afraid the defendant might return to the
residence and remove the money. 72 The agent did note, however,
that a warrant could ordinarily be obtained in under four hours, but
rarely over the phone. 73 He conceded that one agent could have
left the scene while the other monitored the situation, but said he
chose to conduct the search nonetheless because he considered the
mother's consent to be sufficient.' 74
The trial court stated that while a person with common author-
ity over an area has the right to consent to a search of the area, a
landlord does not ordinarily have the power to authorize a search of
a tenant's space.' 75 It found that the "defendant had something in
163 Id at 808.
164 Id.




169 Id. A consent form provides additional evidence of consent at trial.
170 Id. at 809.
171 Id. at 809-10.
172 Id. at 809.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 810. See also Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961)(landlord not
authorized to allow police to search defendant's home).
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the nature of landlord-tenant relationship with his mother," but said
that the relevant issue in this case was a balance between the extent
of the defendant's expectation of privacy and the scope of his
mother's authority over his belongings. 176 The court noted that
Rodriguez requires that the FBI agents reasonably believed that the
defendant's mother had power to authorize the search, despite the
fact that "in the abstract" the search of the defendant's jacket may
have been unreasonable. 177 The court stated that Agent Salter rea-
sonably believed that the defendant was not paying rent at the time
of the search and "gave no thought" to the fact that the defendant
paid when he had the means to pay.' 78 Thus, the trial court con-
cluded that the agents reasonably believed Farrie could consent to
the search and denied the defendant's motion to suppress the
money found in his jacket pockets.'
79
The D.C. Circuit reversed the lower court's decision.180 The
appellate court began its analysis by invoking Rodriguez and noted
that "it is not clear whether the district court thought the agents had
the facts straight but were confused about the law, or whether it
thought the agents had operated under some factual misconcep-
tion." 181 The appellate court stated that, although the district court
found reasonable not only a search of the defendant's room but also
of his jacket, the FBI "agents simply did not have enough informa-
tion to make that judgment." 182 The court noted that the fact that
the room was unlocked and that Farrie had "mutual use" of it may
have indicated that she could consent to a search of the room, but
found that the agents asked no questions which suggested that Far-
rie had access to her son's closet orjacket.18 3 The court added that
the agents never asked her if "she cleaned her son's room, visited
with him there, stored any of her possessions in the room, watched
television there, or made use of the room at any time for any pur-
pose."'184 The court emphasized that it is the government's burden
to show that a third party had authority to consent to a search under
Rodriguez and held that the government had failed to meet the bur-
den in this case. 18 5
176 Whitfield, 747 F. Supp. at 809, 812.
177 Id. at 812.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 United States v. Whitfield, 939 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
181 Id. at 1073-74.
182 Id. at 1074.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 1075.
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The court decided that whether an adult child pays rent may
not be a dispositive factor: a child who does not pay rent may very
exclusively use a room and expect privacy, whereas an adult child
who does pay rent may, nonetheless, choose to not keep anything
out of the family's general access.' 8 6 The court pointed to the fact
that, under Matlock and Rodriguez, agents who are faced with ambigu-
ous situations must make further inquiries before conducting a war-
rantless search. 187  In conclusion, the court reiterated the
importance of the underlying policy goals: "[i]f the information
gleaned from those inquiries is insufficient to establish apparent au-
thority, the Fourth Amendment demands that the agents procure a
warrant."I 88
Despite the D.C. Circuit's favorable decision, the differing con-
clusions on the same facts applying the same legal test indicate the
inherent unreliability of the Rodriguez test. Agents continue to lack
the incentive to adequately investigate and discover the true state of
affairs. Whether officer questions are reasonable is not the issue so
much as whether they can convince a jury that their questioning was
reasonable. Defendants' rights are further endangered, even in the
D.C. Circuit, by police officers' ability to ask the questions they be-
lieve will elicit a favorable response rather than ones which are
aimed at determining the actual relationship between the consenter
and the suspect. Thus, the Supreme Court's reasonableness test has
occasionally led to protection of third-party interests when the third
party has no relationship to the property searched.
B. SUSPECTS CANNOT ADEQUATELY FORESEE AND PREPARE
THEMSELVES FOR SEARCHES
A defendant may not even know when a search is possible
under the Rodriguez rule. Presumably, a defendant would have some
idea that her spouse might consent to a search of common areas
without her presence. However, a defendant cannot know that a
stranger or party in whom no common authority rests may consent
to a search. In tort law, such lack of foreseeability frequently leads
to a denial of liability, because to impose liability under such condi-
tions is seen as "fundamentally unfair" and not within the risk as-
sumed. 189 At a deeper level, the reason that such a label has been




189 See generally William Shepard McAninch, Unreasonable Expectations: The Supreme Court
and the Fourth Amendment, 20 STETSON L. REV. 435 (1991).
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could do little or nothing to prevent the situation or to remedy it at
its early stages. Similarly, a criminal defendant has no ability to
shield his privacy interests because he cannot know when someone
who lacks sufficient authority over his property will permit a
search.190 The relationship between a third party who lacks author-
ity and the defendant is, by definition, too attenuated for the de-
fendant to recognize the risk of a search.
United States v. Kinney, 19 1 in which the Fourth Circuit validated a
search of a locked closet by the police at the request of the defend-
ant's girlfriend, illustrates the unforeseeability problem. The de-
fendant's girlfriend, Akers, waited until the defendant had fallen
asleep and took his keys out of his pants pocket. The keys opened a
locked closet in the apartment where they both lived.'9 2 Inside the
closet she found guns with which, she later testified, the defendant
had threatened her.193 Because Akers believed that the guns might
be stolen and because the defendant had threatened her with them,
she called the police. When they arrived, she asked the officers to
open the closet and take the guns. The officers asked if she lived
there and if her name was on the lease. 194 When they did not take
further action after she told them that she had lived there four
months and that she was unsure whether her name was on the lease,
she again took the defendant's keys and opened the closet her-
self.'9 5 The officers called in the serial numbers on the guns and
discovered that a warrant for a parole violation was outstanding on
the defendant and arrested him. 196 At that point Akers asked the
police to clear the closet. When the police cleared the closet, they
found stolen guns and drug paraphernalia. Based on the items
found in the closet, the police obtained a search warrant for the
apartment and found two more guns and seventy-two packets of co-
caine. 197 The defendant challenged all of the evidence obtained
during the warrantless search. After a conviction on drug and fire-
arm offenses, he appealed to the Fourth Circuit. 198
The Fourth Circuit concluded that Akers definitely did not have
190 It should be remembered that in Fourth Amendment cases, the issue is not the
ultimate guilt of the individual, but the protection society wishes to have against various
searches and seizures. See infra note 246 and accompanying text.
191 953 F.2d 863 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2976 (1992).
192 Id. at 864.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 864-65.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 864-65.
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authority to allow the search of the closet.' 9 9 Even though she had
shared the apartment with the defendant, he had kept the closet
locked at all times, and Akers had not seen the inside of the closet
until the day of the search.20 0 However, using the Rodriguez test, the
court nonetheless decided that the officers' beliefs were reasonable
because Akers was a co-inhabitant of the residence, had a key in her
possession, and opened the door for the officers. The court also
noted that the closet's proximity to the front door implied general
access. 2 0 1 As a result, it would not be unreasonable for the officers
to believe that Akers "ordinarily had authority" to enter the closet,
even though the police knew she had taken the key while the de-
fendant was asleep. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit upheld the search
of the closet.
20 2
This decision erodes the protection granted by the Fourth
Amendment. The defendant in Kinney could not foresee the war-
rantless invasion of his privacy by police because the closet was
locked and he had no reason to suspect his girlfriend would call the
police. If Kinney's girlfriend had usual access to this part of the
apartment, the outcome would have been easily justified under com-
mon authority over a space; however, the court specifically held that
she did not have such access. 20 3 As a result, the defendant could not
take steps to comply with the law or at least prepare himself for this
invasion of his privacy.
In People v. Smith, 20 4 the defendant had rented a house from
Robinson in February on a month-to-month basis. 20 5 When the de-
fendant missed his April payment, Robinson looked in the windows
of the house and, seeing that some of the defendant's belongings
were gone, assumed he had moved out. 20 6 He also noticed that a
new padlock, for which he had no key, had been attached to the
front door and that the back door had been nailed shut.20
7
The police told Robinson that during April they were trying to
contact the defendant. On May 4, the police again talked with
Robinson, who again said that he had not had contact with the de-
fendant and that another month's rent was past due.20 8 When the
199 Id. at 866.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 867.
202 Id.
203 See id. at 864-65.
204 561 N.E.2d 252 (Il1. App. Ct. 1990).
205 Id. at 254.
206 Id.




police asked Robinson if he intended to remove the defendant's be-
longings, Robinson responded that he was going to the residence
that day and that he would allow the officers to enter with him. He
also signed a form acknowledging consent to the search.20 9 When
they entered, the apartment smelled, the power was turned off, the
house was a mess, and some furniture had been removed.2 10 The
officers found evidence which was used in the defendant's murder
trial.
During trial, the defendant objected to the inclusion of evi-
dence discovered during the search of his home on the ground that
he was still the lawful resident of the house and therefore his land-
lord could not consent to a search of the premises. 211 To show that
he had not abandoned the residence, he pointed to the fact that he
had installed a new padlock on the door and explained that the
house was a mess like any "untidy bachelor['s]" house might be.212
Robinson also stated that he had never served the defendant with an
eviction notice nor tacked one on the defendant's door, nor had he
taken any legal steps to remove the defendant.213 However, the de-
fendant admitted to having moved out of the residence shortly after
the shooting because his power had been turned off.2 14 In an unre-
lated traffic case on May 10, the defendant listed his address as dif-
ferent from that of the house.215
The trial court found that the police had talked to Robinson
several times from April to May 4 regarding the defendant's wherea-
bouts and, in light of the spoiled food, even if defendant had been
using the house for storage, the defendant could have contacted
Robinson about the late rent payments to prevent Robinson from
entering the premises and removing the defendant's property. The
trial court found this to be ample evidence of abandonment. The
court thus denied his motion to suppress, and he was convicted. He
then appealed to the Illinois appellate court.216
In dicta, the appellate court specifically addressed the implica-
tions of Rodriguez in this case.2 17 The appellate court stated that if
the defendant had not abandoned the premises in question, and if
the police, "based on the totality of the circumstances before them,"
209 Id. at 254.
210 Id. at 155.
211 Ia- at 255.
212 Id
213 Id at 254-55.
214 Idi at 255.
215 Id
216 Id
217 Id at 259.
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reasonably believed that the defendant had abandoned the prem-
ises, the evidence from the search would be admissible.2 18 The
court noted that agents of the government need not always be cor-
rect in this regard; rather, they simply must always be reasonable. 2
19
Thus, although the appellate court agreed that abandonment had
occurred in this case, the appellate court concluded that the police
search based only on a reasonable belief of abandonment would
have nonetheless been reasonable based on the facts in this case.
220
In situations like Smith, the defendant cannot foresee the inva-
sion of his living space. That defendant in Smith had placed a new
lock on his door and may have had a right to an eviction notice
before his landlord entered his residence without his permission.
22'
Thus, even if he had not paid the rent, the court stated that the
police would have been reasonable in their belief that the landlord
could enter the defendant's apartment, while the defendant would
not expect such an entry. Although the landlord could have prop-
erly entered the property for routine maintenance work,222 that fact
does not imply that the police may enter in connection with such
typical landlord duties. 2
23
218 Id.
219 Id. at 260.
220 Id.
221 See also Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961) (landlord not authorized to
allow police to search defendant's home).
222 See, e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (repairmen permitted to enter
hotel rooms without a warrant to conduct ordinary repairs).
223 Several other cases also illustrate why lack of foreseeability is a potential problem
when third parties who do not have actual authority are permitted to consent to a
search. See, e.g., State v. Charles, 602 So. 2d 15 (La. Ct. App. 1992), writ granted in part on
other issue, denied in part,judgment affirmed, 607 So. 2d 566 (1992), appeal after remand, 617
So. 2d 895 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Cowart v. State, 579 So. 2d 1 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990);
United States v. Whitfield, 747 F. Supp. 807 (D.D.C. 1990), rev'd, 939 F.2d 1071 (D.C.
Cir. 1991); Davis v. State, 414 S.E.2d 902 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) rev'd, 422 S.E.2d. 546
(1992), on remand 432 S.E.2d 273 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). In Davis, using an actual authority
test and reinforcing its statements with the reasonableness standard of Rodriguez, the
court upheld the validity of a search of the home of a mother and step-father, conducted
pursuant to consent granted by their ten-year-old son. The appellate court noted that,
in finding the ten-year old had authority to allow the search, the trial court said that the
child was "bright, articulate and educated." Id. at 903. Moreover, the court said that
because the child was a "latch-key" child who often stayed at home alone after school for
an hour and a half, let himself into the house with his own key, and called his mother
from her bedroom telephone to alert her that he was home, he possessed adequate au-
thority to allow the search. Id. The trial court had, nonetheless, admitted evidence that
tended to show that the child could not have friends over when his parents were not at
home but that his parents did allow him to have visitors when they were at home. Id.
Furthermore, the parents had told the child to call 911 if there were ever a problem
when they were not at home. Id. The Georgia court said that the factors to be consid-
ered are whether the minor had reached age 18, whether he lived on the premises,
whether the minor had access to the premises or could invite others thereto, whether he
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C. NO SIGNIFICANT INCREMENTAL PROTECTION OF THIRD PARTIES'
RIGHTS
The Rodiguez reasonableness test does little to advance the pol-
icy of protecting a third party's right to consent to a search of the
premises in his own right as a co-inhabitant. This problem should
be prima facie clear. If a person in reality does not have authority
over the premises, what rights in the property does that person have
to protect? If a person is concerned about illegal activity in his
neighbor's house, he should exercise his right to complain to the
police and "swear out" a warrant to protect his safety.
In Cowart v. State,224 the court applied the Rodriguez test to up-
hold a search where an officer reasonably believed that a third party
shared authority over a gym bag with the defendant. Believing that
a murder suspect was staying at Laura Whitney's apartment, an of-
ficer went to her place of business and began talking to her about
the murder.225 Noticing her uneasiness, he asked if she would be
more comfortable talking at her own home and she responded af-
firmatively. She invited the officer inside at which time he noticed a
gym bag lying on the floor of the apartment. When he asked her to
whom it belonged, she said it was hers and Cowart's. 226 The officer
then picked up the bag, set it on the couch and was able to see a
knife which Whitney denied was hers.227 The defendant was subse-
quently arrested for felony murder.22
8
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence because the
knife had been recovered from the gym bag in Whitney's apartment
as part of an illegal search. At the suppression hearing, both
Whitney and Cowart denied they had common ownership of the bag
and stated that it belonged solely to the defendant. The court, how-
ever, denied Cowart's request for suppression. He was convicted of
was at an age where he could exercise some level of discretion, and "whether the officers
acted reasonably in believing that the minor had sufficient control over the premises to
give a valid consent to search." Id. at 903-04. In considering these factors, the court
found that adequate authority existed. Id. Moreover, it mentioned Rodriguez in its analy-
sis to show the reasonableness of the officers' actions in assuming the child had control
over the premises. Id. at 904.
The Georgia Supreme Court recognized the appellate court's error and concluded
that there was not actual or implied authority to consent under Matlock. Davis v. State,
422 S.E.2d 546 (1992), on remand 432 S.E.2d 273 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). The court did not
discuss whether a reasonable belief by police could have cleansed the search.
See also supra note 131 discussing the possibility of a set-up by one's neighbor.
224 579 So. 2d 1 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990).
225 Id. at 2.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 2-3.
228 Id. at 1.
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murder and appealed the admission of the knife to the appellate
court.
2 2 9
The appellate court relied on the Rodriguez reasonableness test
to uphold the search. 230 In stressing that the beliefs of the police
were reasonable, the court observed that Whitney claimed to have
"common authority" over the bag and that the bag was open for all
to see its contents. 23 1 Additionally, the court stated that she opened
the bag wider when the officer asked her to do so.232 Moreover, the
court noted that the officer was apprehensive as to the truth of
Whitney's statements when he found the knife, but found that these
statements were relevant to Whitney's knowledge of the crime
rather than her ownership of the athletic bag.233 Finally, like in
Charles, the court also stated that as a temporary guest at Whitney's
apartment, the defendant had a diminished expectation of pri-
vacy. 2 34 On these factors, the court concluded that the search was a
reasonable exercise of a police search and upheld the search as
valid. 235
An approach requiring true third-party authority could protect
third parties just as effectively as the reasonableness test of Rodri-
guez. If the girlfriend had a fear of the contents of the bag, she could
have had the officers remove the bag-a solution which would not
have caused a reduction in the defendant's rights. The officers sim-
ply could not examine the contents until they procured a warrant.
The lack of increased protection of third parties' rights can also be
seen in several other cases discussed previously. 236 Because there is
no significant increase in third-party protection, another of the poli-
cies for permitting warrantless searches is not furthered when true
shared authority of a third party is not present.
VI. ALTERNATIVE TESTS
In response to the perceived problems of the majority's test in
Rodriguez, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens,
claimed that reasonable authority would not adequately protect the
accused's rights.237 His proposition has been supported (as well as,
229 Id. at 3.
230 Id. at 3-4.
231 Id. at 4.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 5.
235 Id.
236 See United States v. Kinney, 953 F.2d 863 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
2976 (1992); People v. Smith, 561 N.E.2d 252 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
237 Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 189 (1990) (Marshall,J., dissenting).
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to some degree, misinterpreted) by Tammy Campbell, who viewed
the dissent as suggesting an actual authority standard.238 This sec-
tion will demonstrate that an "actual authority" test does not ade-
quately respond to the problems of third-party consent and will
suggest that the Court replace the Rodriguez reasonableness test with
a "common authority in fact" test.
A. MARSHALL'S DISSENT
While not stating a test, Justice Marshall, writing for the dissent,
argued that only if a defendant voluntarily chooses to limit her
rights will the Fourth Amendment not be violated by a third-party
consent to a search.239 This focus on the defendant's conduct
stands in stark contrast to the majority's opinion, which focused on
the reasonableness of the officer's beliefs. 240 Marshall argued that
the majority's decision rested on a faulty interpretation of the basis
for third party consents.24' He explained that, under the majority's
reading, the validity of such searches would rest on the reasonable-
ness of the officers' beliefs about consent under the Fourth Amend-
ment, not on the premise that a third party may voluntarily give up
some of his rights over the property by choosing to share it with
another.242 Marshall noted that searches inside houses are pre-
sumptively unreasonable without a warrant unless necessary for
compelling law enforcement goals.243 He continued:
[b]ecause the sole law enforcement purpose underlying third-party
consent searches is avoiding the inconvenience of securing a warrant,
a departure from the warrant requirement is not justified simply be-
cause an officer reasonably believes a third party has consented to a
search of the defendant's home.2 4 4
Thus, Marshall directly attacked the majority's premise that reason-
ableness of belief and minor police error can justify an infringement
on a defendant's rights and implied that it promoted lazy police
procedure. 245
Marshall also observed that a warrant serves an important
function:
[T]he Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the cit-
izen and the police. This was done not to shield criminals nor to make
238 Campbell, supra note 132, at 492-94.
239 Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 190 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
240 Id. at 189.
241 Id.
242 Id. at 189-90.
243 Id. at 190.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 190-91.
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the home a safe haven for illegal activities. It was done so that an
objective mind might weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to
enforce the law.
24 6
Marshall criticized the majority for downplaying the fact that the
judgment of a zealous investigator may be clouded by the situa-
tion. 24 7 The Court, Marshall explained, has generally rejected most
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment protection because the Bill of
Rights was intended to protect the privacy of a person's home and
property from sacrifice in the name of simplifying law enforce-
ment.2 48 In other words, Marshall asserted that human and consti-
tutional rights outweigh the pragmatic concerns of the majority in
providing effective police protection. Thus, in balancing the inter-
ests of the government and the individual, he concluded that the
weight clearly falls on the side of protecting defendant's rights.2 49
Nonetheless, he defended at length the "assumption of the
risk" nature of third-party consent to police searches of shared
property.2 50 Marshall noted that the Court's decisions "demon-
strate that third-party consent searches are free from constitutional
challenge only to the extent that they rest on consent by a party
empowered to do sO. ' '251 Thus, he attacked the reasonableness test
that the majority proposed because it allows third-party consent
when no agreement between the defendant and the consenting
party exists regarding the third party's ability to consent, as a co-
inhabitant or otherwise. He concluded that police should get a war-
rant, rather than rely on third-party consent, and "must therefore
accept the risk of error should they instead choose to rely on con-
sent. ' 2 52 Unfortunately, Marshall proposed no alternative test as a
part of his criticism of the majority's opinion. This stopping point
provides the basis for the common authority in fact test proposed
below.
B. THE ACTUAL AUTHORITY APPROACH
Campbell supported Justice Marshall's opinion and asserted
that "actual authority" should be present to validate a search.
2 53
Because Fourth Amendment case law suggests that it protects per-
sons (as opposed to places) from unreasonable searches, Campbell
246 Id. at 191.
247 Id.
248 Id. at 192.
249 Id. at 192-93.
250 Id. at 194.
251 Id. at 198.
252 Id. at 193.
253 Campbell, supra note 132, at 494.
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suggested that a "knowing and intelligent waiver" should be neces-
sary to validate a third-party consent to search.254 While she ac-
knowledged that certain situations, such as exigent circumstances,
may permit warrantless searches, she asserted that no exigent cir-
cumstances were present in Rodriguez, and therefore the search was
invalid.255 She distinguished situations where a reasonable belief in
the exigent circumstances may lead to the need to conduct a search
without a warrant from a situation where there is reasonable belief
in a party's ability to consent.256 Campbell then criticized the possi-
ble results of apparent authority tests.257 Using Rodriguez itself as an
example, she noted that the defendant was present in the residence
at the time of the search and could have been awakened. 258 Thus,
she concluded that the potential for police misuse of the test could
be a true threat to the accused. 259
C. WHY ACTUAL AUTHORITY FAILS
Campbell, like the Rodriguez majority, has missed the mark. Her
proposed test of actual authority carries with it a host of new
problems. First, actual authority will never work in practice. Sec-
ond, since third parties cannot satisfy an actual authority standard,
legally astute criminals will have an incentive to use common spaces
to store criminal evidence. Finally, this practice would allow
criminals to shift some of the costs of their acts onto innocent par-
ties. Each of these shortcomings will be discussed in more detail.
Actual authority will simply never work in practice. According
to Campbell, the search of a common area under the actual author-
ity rule would require an express waiver by the defendant. No sensi-
ble criminal would permit his co-inhabitant to allow a search by the
police of a common area. While a person would retain the right,
insofar as the property was hers, to allow a search, if the police ever
actually entered the house they would be violating the accused's
rights, insofar as he had not given actual authority to search an area.
Thus, the unworkable nature of such a test is clear.
However, an even more troublesome aspect of this test is its
practical effect. If a criminal does not wish to consent to a search of
an area, and knows that his wife cannot permit a search of the area
because he has not given her actual authority to do so, he has every
254 Id
255 Id. at 494-95.
256 Id at 494-96.
257 Id at 494-500.
258 Id. at 499.
259 Id. at 498-500.
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incentive to use common space to store the equipment used in, and
the profits from, his criminal activity. Since he has not expressly
granted authority over the area to anyone, he will be protected from
a search.
As a result, beyond the harm that the accused has caused soci-
ety through the commission of a crime, his property rights will be
protected at the expense of an innocent person's rights in the prop-
erty. The co-inhabitant will almost definitely not be compensated
for lost use of the property. Thus, the accused will get use of more
than his share of the property, effectively rent-free. The co-inhabit-
ant, on the other hand, is, in effect, made to subsidize the defend-
ant's criminal behavior because she has paid for use of the common
space but must bear the cost of losing protection of her rights in it.
On a less theoretical level, short of a warrant, the innocent co-
inhabitant cannot even summon police protection. Thus, she may
even be implicated in the crime and be forced to bear the expense of
clearing her name from a criminal charge which she should not have
to face. Thus, the actual authority test does not appear to protect
rights more clearly than the reasonableness test.
VII. COMMON AUTHORITY IN FACT
In light of the problems discussed above, this Comment pro-
poses a new test designed to advance the various policies underlying
the Fourth Amendment, while avoiding the shortcomings of other
tests. This test is a test of common authority in fact. Courts using
such a test would ask whether a person actually has express or im-
plied common authority over the premises and is thus able to con-
sent to a search of the premises. The protections afforded by this
test balance the rights of defendants and third parties. This test fo-
cuses the inquiry on the defendant and the officer's beliefs about the
defendant's guilt and consent to searches. This stands in contrast to
the Rodriguez Court's focus on the officer's beliefs about the state-
ments of a third party who may not have a sufficient relationship
with the defendant. Further, the test corrects some of the other
doctrinal concerns with the reasonableness test.
First, this test avoids the hazards of the reasonableness test by
allowing only a party who has actual or implied shared authority
over the premises to consent to a search. Thus, a defendant does
not have to be concerned about the possible retaliation of neighbors
or people who are not foreseeable "consenters" putting his proce-
dural rights in danger. By the same token, the defendant will know
who can consent and can take steps to adequately protect his privacy
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if he believes a co-inhabitant is endangering his privacy. In the most
extreme case, he could simply move out.
Second, the test does not go so far as actual authority, and thus
may be a more workable standard since there will rarely, if ever, be
an express grant of authority given by a co-inhabitant. While there
may be some difficulties in determining in court that common au-
thority in fact existed, this, like the reasonableness of an officer's
belief, would be a determination left to the jury, or the judge in a
motion to suppress. Even if it is a more difficult standard for officers
to meet in practice, in theory it upholds Fourth Amendment policies
better than Rodriguez because it protects against the theoretical
problems of guarding potential defendants against unreasonable
searches as discussed above. Moreover, the common authority in
fact test does nothing to impede the procurement of a warrant
should authority be an issue for an officer.
Third, the common authority in fact standard protects a third
party's interest in the property. While not allowing just any person
on the street to consent to a search of the house, this test does rec-
ognize the costs of criminal behavior on a co-inhabitant and shifts
the burden back to the criminal's shoulders. If a criminal chooses to
use common space for his criminal activities, a third party with
whom he shares authority will still retain the option of summoning
authorities to conduct a search. This test only eliminates the ability
of third parties, with whom the defendant did not voluntarily choose
to share space, to authorize a search. In short, a third-party co-in-
habitant should not be forced to submit to a loss of property rights,
safety and ability to call the police, while a criminal uses common
space as a veritable warehouse for criminal supplies and earnings.
Fourth, the test tends to encourage police to seek out a warrant
if they are unsure whether the party with whom they have spoken
has authority over the premises. Consistent with Justice Marshall's
suggestion, police may take the risk of a third party not being au-
thorized to permit a search, and the resulting suppression of evi-
dence after the search.2 60 With the history of the Fourth
Amendment's preference for search warrants, 261 little remains to
justify why police should not seek a warrant if doubt exists. A search
warrant will better protect the accused's rights because it has to be
sworn for a specific item. This, as a result, tends to protect the ac-
cused from wholesale invasion of privacy from those who may in
reality not have common authority. Thus, at the very least, if rights
260 See generally Maclin, supra, note 121.
261 See, e.g., United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
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are violated incorrectly, this restricts the violation to a limited area.
Significantly, if there is a doubt over the authority-for example, the
authority of a small child to give consent-a search warrant provides
the solution. Lastly, if there remains a fear that the accused will
sneak away or dispose of evidence in the interim, an officer may be
stationed outside the accused's house while the warrant is being se-
cured. 262 If the accused is a sufficient threat to the community, the
cost of stationing an officer should be considered minimal com-
pared to the net benefit to society. Under the common authority in
fact test, these mechanisms, which already exist under current law
and police practice, will be used to help balance defendants' rights
against the worthy goal of effective law enforcement.
Fifth, if there are concerns that the possessor of property would
lie to the police in order to have the evidence revealed and subse-
quently barred from use against the suspect, the possessor may be
prosecuted as an aider and abettor in a felony. Also, obstruction of
justice charges could possibly be issued against the possessor who
wrongfully consents. It is presumed that the possessor would not
often choose to "take the fall" for the criminal, and with harsh
enough penalties for these crimes, the incidence of such behavior
should be significantly reduced. Moreover, the evidence could still
be used against the lying possessor, to the extent that he was in-
volved in the criminal activity.
Admittedly, the common authority in fact test does have short-
comings, but none great enough to bar its usage altogether. The
time and expense required to secure a lawful arrest will increase be-
cause police must investigate and ask numerous questions to be cer-
tain whether common authority in fact exists and a warrant would be
necessary. In fact, it will require a warrant in almost every third-
party consent case unless the police are absolutely certain of the au-
thority. Even though the test would slow down law enforcement ac-
tivities, this is a relatively small price to pay for the added protection
to criminal defendants' rights which the test provides.
VIII. APPLICATION TO SELECTED CASES
In Cowart v. State,263 in which the defendant left his gym bag at
Whitney's residence and the police officer opened it up to examine
the contents, the common authority in fact test would lead to sup-
262 Presumably, if the situation is sufficient to constitute an exigent circumstance, the
search may be executed without a warrant despite the lack of consent. Warren, Md.
Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
263 579 So. 2d 1 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990). See supra notes 224-35 and accompanying
text for a full discussion of the case.
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pression of the knife found in the bag. The officer in that case ad-
mitted to being a bit wary about opening the bag when Whitney
identified the bag as hers and the defendant's. Even though
Whitney lied in this case, since it turned out the bag belonged only
to the defendant, this is an insufficient reason to allow the evidence
to be used against the defendant. Nevertheless, it might have been
possible to charge Whitney with obstruction of justice.
If Whitney had wanted the bag removed, that would not have
been a problem. While she could not have authorized a search of
the bag, she could have authorized a search of the apartment. Thus,
the police could have confiscated the bag, but not have examined or
used the contents without the defendant's consent or a warrant. As
a result, both Whitney's rights and those of the defendant would
have been protected. The common authority in fact test would have
enabled the court to adequately protect the defendant's rights with-
out significantly impeding law enforcement or endangering public
safety.
In United States v. Sudzus, 264 the receptionist who allowed the
DEA agents to search her bosses' offices did not have common au-
thority in fact. The burden on the agents to get a warrant would
have been slight.265 Further, this is a classic example of why reason-
ableness fails. The agents asked the receptionist if she had control
over the premises and if she had access to the building. When she
responded affirmatively, the agents scoured the offices. Although a
receptionist would probably be unlikely to possess such authority, a
test like reasonableness in this case encourages agents to get only as
much information as is necessary so that the court or jury will find
that the agents had "reasonable beliefs." Common authority in fact
would solve such dilemmas. The test may avoid what are actually
"unreasonable searches" because the question of whether the third
party had the requisite authority would be decided at trial. This
would remove the incentives to lie with regard to the questions
asked of the third party and to only seek out favorable information
during the investigation because even if the agents said they asked
questions sufficient to determine the third party's authority, whether
the third party claimed to have authority would be irrelevant to the
determination of whether common authority in fact existed.
264 No. 92 Cr 102, 1992 WL 162959 (N.D. Ill. July 2, 1992). See supra notes 133-44
and accompanying text for a full discussion of the case.
265 The agents knew a drug sale was occurring. Furthermore, they already had the
premises secured before they received consent from Barbra Sudzus. Thus, there was




The common authority in fact test would also alleviate situa-
tions such as the ten-year-old who "told on" his parents in Davis v.
State.266 While the child clearly had an interest in his own safety, few
adults would look at such a child as a figure of authority, even if the
only object over which he exercised such power was a house. There
is also a significant chance for impure motives in a case such as this,
in which the child may have disliked his stepfather. In addition, ma-
ture choices, such as whether to allow police into a residence, are
likely to be beyond the comprehension of many children. If the po-
lice truly believed the child was in danger, nothing would have pre-
vented them from removing him from his household until the
situation was resolved. Further, the law does not prevent a ten-year-
old from giving a sufficiently detailed description for a court to issue
a warrant to recover contraband of which he has personal knowl-
edge. Moreover, the accused parties would be protected from hav-
ing their entire home invaded with such a warrant requirement.
Instead, only the areas and items which the child could describe in
particularity would be open to inspection. Thus, both the child's
and the parents' rights would be better protected.
The test would also avoid the situation that caused the district
court to decide for one party and the appellate court to rule for the
other in United States v. Whitfteld.2 67 This was the case in which the
son "rented" a room in the house from his mother, but only paid
rent when he could afford it. Whether the mother had common au-
thority to allow the search was unclear, but again an agent could
have waited at the door to the defendant's room until a warrant was
obtained, since the mother freely allowed the agents in the house.
Thus, monitoring the room would not have been a problem. Fur-
ther, under the reasonableness standard, agents are more likely to
"try" to believe the Farrie Whitfields of the world in cases like this,
since they are interested in gathering evidence and making the
arrest. Moreover, while factors such as whether the third party had
authority are very difficult to evaluate in the heat of the moment, in
this case there was little justification for rushing to secure the evi-
dence. 268 No one else in the house was in danger, and surely the
agents could have secured the room from the outside until a warrant
266 414 S.E.2d 902 (Ga. Ct. App.), rev'd, 422 S.E.2d 546 (Ga. 1992), on remand 432
S.E.2d 273 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). See supra note 223 for a discussion of this case.
267 747 F. Supp. 807 (D.D.C. 1990), rev'd, 939 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1991). See supra
notes 162-88 and accompanying text for a full discussion of the case.
268 If there were a rush, it would likely be due to hot pursuit and thus fall directly
under the long recognized exigency exception to the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., War-
den, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
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could be issued. In short, to validate the search in a case such as this
strikes at the core of the Fourth Amendment. If a person cannot
expect her own jacket in her own closet in her own rented room to
be safe from anyone who consents, the heart of the Fourth Amend-
ment is lost.
IX. CONCLUSION
Unlike the reasonableness test enunciated by the Court in Rod-
riguez, the common authority in fact test offers a solution through
which both accuseds' and third parties' rights are protected. The
test takes into account the policies underlying the Fourth Amend-
ment described in cases like Matlock and Katz, as well as those dis-
cussed by Marshall in his Rodriguez dissent. The test would prevent
a defendant's right to security in his home or property from being
violated without some notice, and would protect a third party's in-
terest in shared property from being imposed upon by a criminal co-
inhabitant. Furthermore, this test would not significantly reduce law
enforcement effectiveness. In conclusion, because the reasonable-
ness standard will not adequately protect defendant's rights, the
common authority in fact test should be adopted by the Supreme
Court.
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